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a crime was being committed together with flight from law 
enforcement officers. In the instant case there was only the 
sight of two men in a parked car and their flight after the 
police started their investigation. In People v. Brown, 45 
Cal.2d 640 [290 P.2d 528], we held that a search incident 
to an arrest could not be justified in the absence of reasonable 
cause under section 836 of the Penal Code merely because it 
revealed that defendant was in fact guilty of a felony. 
(People v. Simon, 45 Cal.2d 645, 648 [290 P.2d 531] .) 
There was, therefore, under the facts here present no reason-
able cause to justify the search and the evidence was inad-
missible. (People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905].) 
I would therefore reverse the judgment. 
[Crim. No. 5759. In Bank. Feb. 3, 1956.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ERNEST BLODGETT 
[DON WILLIAMS], Appellant. 
[1] Searches and Seizures-Justification for.-A search of a cab 
cannot be justified on the ground that the cab driver could 
have been arrested for double parking, iince it has no relation 
to the traffic violation and would not be incidental to an arrest 
therefor. 
[2] Arrest-Without Warrant.-There is nothing unreasonable in 
an officer's questioning persons outdoors at night, or in order-
ing them out of a cab for questioning at night where their 
unusual conduct warrants it. 
[3] Searches and Seizures~Justification for.-Where an officer, 
who had reasonable grounds for ordering suspects from a cab 
for questioning, saw defendant's furtive action in withdrawing 
his left hand from behind the seat at the juncture of the seat 
and back cushion, the officer had reasonable grounds to believe 
that defendant was hiding contraband, and a search of the 
cab was reasonable. 
[4a, 4b] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of 
Prosecuting Attorney.-In a prosecution for illegal possession 
of marijuana, misconduct of the prosecuting attorney in at-
tempting to suggest to the jury that defendant had taken 
heroin the evening before his arrest did not constitute ground 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Searches and Seizures, § 52 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Searches and Seizures, § 1; [2] 
Arrest, § 5; [4] Criminal Law, § 1404(6); [5] Witnesses, § 100. 
§ 
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Witnesses-Questions.-QuPstions nskP<l of witnPssps on either 
or cross-Pxnmination, relating to the taking of heroin 
def'Pndant on the evening preceding his arrest, are im-
proper in a for possession of marijuana. 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
and from an order denying a new trial. Charles 
Snook, ,Judge. Affirmed. 
for illegal possession of marijuana. Judgment 
affirmed. 
F. Marlowe for Appellant. 
G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Victor Griffith, Deputy 
General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant was found guilty by a jury 
of one count of possessing marijuana in violation of Health 
am1 Safety Code, section 11500. His motions for probation 
for a new trial were denied, and he was sentenced to 
three months in the county jail. He appeals from the 
and the order denying his motion for a new trial. 
approximately 8 p. m. on August 4, 1954, Nowlin 
Sanders and Mrs. Jacqueline Grundy met defendant on the 
street near the ·willow Hotel at 7th and ·willow in Oakland. 
Sanders had known defendant for about three months. The 
three went into the restroom of the hotel where they stayed 
five or ten minutes. Defendant gave Sanders $10 to 
some kind of purchase. Sanders left the hotel, made 
thi' purchase, and returned, and the three spent another ten 
minutes in the restroom. 'l'hey then visited a friend in 
another hotel, and after they left and were walking on the 
defendant told Mrs. Grundy and Sanders that he had 
five "joints of pot" i.e., marijuana. Defendant and 
Sanders shared a marijuana cigarette, and the parties sep-
m·ated. At approximately 3 a. m. the following morning 
Grundy and Sanders were together at the vVillow Hotel. 
Sanders left to get a cab, found one at a taxi stand a block 
a1vay, got in the front seat and asked the driver to drive 
to the hotel. The cab double parked in front of the hotel 
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and Sanders went in. Shortly thereafter Mrs. 
out of the hotel, got in the cab, and sat on the side of 
the rear seat. At about the same time defendant approached 
the cab and told the driver that he wished to go to 12th and 
Broadway. 'rhe driver told him that if his other fare was 
going in the same direction, he could go along. Defendant 
then entered the cab and sat on the left side of the rear seat. 
In the meantime, Officers Barker and Tarabochia of the 
Oakland Police Department had been observing the cab as 
it stood in front of the hotel and decided to investigate it. 
They approached and ordered the occupants to get out. As 
Officer Barker opened the left rear door he saw defendant 
withdraw his left hand from behind the seat at the juncture 
of the seat and back cushion. After defendant and Mrs. 
Grundy got out, the officer removed the rear seat and found 
three marijuana cigarettes where defendant had withdrawn 
his hand. The driver testified that earlier in the evening he 
had to clean out the back of his cab because a passenger had 
been ilL He had taken the seat out and at that time there 
were no cigarettes in the back of the cab. No one had been 
in the back seat thereafter until Mrs. Grundy and defendant 
sat there. After the officers had ordered Mrs. Grundy and 
defendant out of the cab, Sanders came out of the hotel. 
The officers then asked the cab driver to take all of them to 
the police station. Sanders asked defendant why they were 
being arrested and defendant replied that the police had 
found some "pot." Defendant told the interviewing officer 
at the police station that at the time he was ordered out of 
the cab he had his left hand in his pocket and took it out 
to push back on the seat to raise himself. He stated that 
he had not smoked marijuana for about a year. At the trial 
he denied having smoked marijuana with Sanders and denied 
placing the marijuana cigarettes in the cab. Mrs. Grundy, 
Sanders, and the driver also denied placing the cigarettes in 
the cab. 
Defendant contends that the search of the cab was unlawful 
and that the evidence obtained thereby was therefore in-
admissible. The search was made without a warrant. [1] Al-
though the cab driver could have been arrested for double 
parking, the search of his cab cannot be justified on that 
ground, for it had no relation to the traffic violation and 
would not have been incidental to an arrest therefor. ( Cf. 
People v. Gorg, 45 Cal.2d 776 [291 P.2d 469] ; Elliott v. 
State, 173 Tenn. 203 [116 S.W.2d 1009, 1012-1013]; Untted 
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285 U.S. 452 [52 S.Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877, 
.) [2] It was justified, however, on another 
There is nothing unreasonable in an officer's ques-
pcrsons outdoors at night. (People v. Simon, 45 
650-651 [290 P.2d 531] ; Gisske v. Sanders, 9 
16-17 [98 P. 43)), and in view of the hour and 
unusual conduct of the occupants of the cab it was not 
for the officers to order them to get out of the 
questioning. [3] Since Officer Barker saw defend-
ant furtive action in getting out, he had reasonable grounds 
to believe that he was hiding contraband and the search of the 
therefore reasonable. (Carrol v. United States, 267 
149 [45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790]; 
v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 701 [51 S.Ct. 240, 
75 L.Ed. 629, 74 A.L.R. 1407]; Scher v. United States, 305 
U 251, 255 [59 S.Ct. 174, 83 L.Ed. 151]; Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 165-171 [69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 
1 United States v. One 1946 Plymouth Sedan Auto-
167 F.2d 3, 7.) 
Defendant also contends that he did not have a fair 
because of misconduct of the prosecuting attorney in 
attempting to suggest to the jury that defendant had taken 
heroin the evening before his arrest. 
his opening statement the prosecuting attorney 
told the jury that defendant, Sanders and Mrs. Grundy had 
into the restroom of the ·willow Hotel, and that while 
had "talked about the purchasing of some heroin." 
defendant's objection the prosecuting attorney told 
the court that he was merely stating what he expected to 
and that he would not prove it if the court ruled the 
out. He was instructed to proceed. He then stated 
that defendant had given Sanders a $10 bill, that Sanders 
and returned a few minutes later with something 
hand, and that the three had "stayed in there for 
or twenty minutes and then departed." 
Grundy testified as a witness for the People. On 
examination, in ansvYer to the question ''And what did 
while you were in the restroom at the \Villow Hotel," 
slw "He [Sandersl pnt a paper which was believed to 
br· heroin--" Defendant objected and the matter was 
up in chambers. The court ruled tl1at testimony con-
the conduct of the parties in the restroom was ad-
missible solely to show their relationship, but struck from 
the record the reference to heroin as "immaterial and as a 
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volunteer statement and not responsive.'' A later objection 
was also sustained when, upon cross-examination, defendant 
was asked, ''And you know the effects [of heroin] because 
you yourself have been the recipient of a shot~" [5] It was 
immaterial to the one-count charge of possession of mari-
juana whether or not defendant had taken heroin the eve-
ning preceding his arrest (see People v. Perez, 128 Cal. 
App.2d 750, 756 [276 P.2d 72] ; People v. Le Beau, 39 Cal. 
2d 146, 148 [245 P.2d 302]), and the trial court therefore 
properly sustained these objections. 
[4b] No further direct reference was made to heroin, 
but Mrs. Grundy and Sanders were questioned in detail 
concerning the activities of the three in the restroom. During 
the questioning it was brought out that they had partaken 
of Sanders' purchase. It is apparent from the repeated 
references to the restroom and the conduct therein that the 
purpose of the questions was to keep constantly before the 
jury the suggestion in the opening statement that could not 
properly be proved. ( Cf. People v. Mullings, 83 Cal. 138, 
145-146 [23 P. 229, 17 Am.St.Rep. 223].) A careful review 
of the entire record convinces us, however, that this mis-
conduct did not result in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. 
Const., art. VI, § 41;2.) 
The judgment and order are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and 
McComb, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I cannot agree that the sight of a cab parked in front of 
a hotel in the early hours of the morning is sufficient to 
constitute reasonable cause for a police investigation. The 
law, as set forth in People v. Sinwn, 45 Ca1.2d 645, 648 
[290 P.2d 531], is that " ... the search of defendant's per-
son may be justified only if he was committing or attempting 
to commit an offense in the officer's presence (Pen. Code, 
§ 836, subd. 1), or the officer had reasonable cause to believe 
he had committed a felony. (Pen. Code, § 836, subd. 5.)" 
,Just how it can be said that two people getting into a cab 
early in the morning is ''unusual conduct'' is not entirely 
clear to me. I had thought that it was a frequent occurrence. 
"Under these circumstances, to permit an officer to justify 
a search on the ground that he 'didn't feel' that a person 
on the street at night had any lawful business there would 
1 rl:1G l PEOPLE V. BLODGETT 
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his person searched by any sus-
officer no matter how unfounded the suspicions were. 
to or from jobs or entertain-
or for exercise or would suffer 
'With the occasional criminal who would be turned up.'' 
,Justice speaking for the court, in People v. 
sup1~a, at pp. 650, 651.) If: the sight of two people 
into a taxicab in front of a hotel early in the morn-
constitutes reasonable cause to believe that a felony is 
"'"'""'""'· then any couple out for an evening of enter-
may be subjected to police surveillance and search. 
the words of Mr. Justice Jackson (United States 
332 U.S. 581, 595 [68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210], is a 
er danger to a free people than the escape of some 
from punishment.'' 
It would appear that the salutary rule of People v. Cahan, 
44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905], is to be circumscribed by an 
and unwarranted extension of the concept of what 
consti1ntes reasonable cause. In People v. Martin, ante, 
p. O(i [2!}:1 P.2d G2], thP sight of two mw parked in 
an automobile at night vvas held to constitute reasonable cause 
for a police investigation and warrant a search of their 
pen;ons and automobile; here, the sight of a man and woman 
in a cab in front of a hotel in the early hours of the 
is held to constitute reasonable cause for police 
and a search of their persons and the taxicab. 
no answer that the search showed illegal possession of 
nareoties since the search may not be justified because it, 
shows that the defendant was guilty of a felony. 
v. B1"'0W11, 45 Cal.2d 640 [290 P.2d fi28l ; People 
43 Ca1.2d 645 1290 P.2d fi3l].) 
the majority opinion it is stated that Officer Barker 
had reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was hiding 
contraband because of his ''furtive action'' in getting out 
of ihe cab for f)nestioning. In Carroll v. United States, 267 
U 1 160 [ 4fi S.Ct. 280, 6rl T.1.Ed. 543, 39 A.I1.R. 790], the 
comt very carefully and at length set forth the evidence 
and noted that the officers had known of the bootlegging 
activities of the defendants for two months prior to the 
sear<~h and seiznre; in Husty v. United Btates, 282 U.S. 694 
[51 S.Ct. 240, 75 L.Ed. 629, 74 A.L.R. 1407], the officer had 
reeeived prior, reliable information that Hnsty was carrying 
eontraband; in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 [69 
1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879], the officer conducting the search 
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had arrested the defendant some five months prior to the 
search for carrying liquor and had seen him on at least two 
occasions in the six months the search loading 
liquor in his car which, on the day in appeared to 
be heavily loaded with what the defendant admitted to be 
liquor; in United States v. One 1946 Plyrnottth Sedan Auto-
mobile, 167 F.2d 3, the officer had received advance reliable 
information that the defendant would make delivery of tax 
unpaid alcohol in a certain vicinity. It may therefore be 
seen that all of the cases relied upon by the majority are 
easily distinguishable from the one here under consideration 
in that in all of them the facts showed sorne basis for suspect-
ing that a crime was being committed. 
I also disagree vehemently with the statement in the ma-
jority opinion that ''there is nothing unreasonable in an 
officer's questioning persons outdoors at night.'' Cited in 
support of this statement are People v. Sirnon, 45 Cal.2d 
645 [290 P.2d 531], and Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal.App. 13 
[98 P. 43], neither of which supports the statement as it is 
here set forth. 
Because the search was conducted without reasonable cause 
to believe on the part of the officers that a felony was being 
committed, the evidence procured thereby was illegally ob-
tained and inadmissible under the rule set forth in People 
v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905] .) 
I would therefore reverse the judgment. 
